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Abstract
Despite the ratification by African states of several human rights instruments
protecting the human rights of women in Africa, and the solemn commitment of
the African states to eliminate all forms of discrimination and harmful practices
against women, women in Africa still continue to experience human rights
violations. Most African women are denied the equal enjoyment of their human
rights, in particular by virtue of the lesser status ascribed to them by tradition and
custom, or as a result of overt or covert discrimination. Many women in Africa
experience distinct forms of discrimination due to the intersection of sex with such
factors as race, language, religion, political and other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth, or other factors, such as age, disability, marital, refugee or
migrant status, resulting in compoundeddisadvantage. Therefore,much remains tobe
done to realize the human rights of women in Africa. This article examines the
relationship between culture and women’s human rights, and makes some
recommendations for the effective realization of these rights.
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the United Nations reported ‘‘in no society today do women enjoy
the same opportunities as men’’.1 More than ten years later, discrimi-
nation against women persists not only in the developing African states,2
but also in the more developed states including Germany3 and
* Lecturer in law, School of Law, Brunel University, West London.
1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 1995: Gender
and Human Development (1995) at 29, available at: ,http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/
1995/en/. (last accessed 12 March 2006). The term ‘‘women’’ is used in this article to
include girls.
2 S Tamale ‘‘Gender trauma in Africa: enhancing women’s links to resources’’ (2004) 48/1
Journal of African Law 50.
3 In 2001, for example, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) observed: ‘‘Like the ILO [International Labour Organization], the Committee is
concerned about the persisting impediments to women in German society, in terms of
promotion in employment and equal wages for work of equal value, both in the private
and public sectors, and especially in federal bodies and academic institutions, despite
the efforts of the State party to give a new impetus to the equal participation of women
in the labour market’’. See CESCR Concluding Observations: Germany E/C12/1/Add68 (24
September 2001) at para 19. See also Human Rights Committee (HRC) Concluding
Observations: GermanyCCPR/CO/80/DEU (4May 2004) at para 13, noting that the ‘‘number of
women in senior positions is still very low’’ and that there are ‘‘wide disparities, in the
private sector, of remuneration between men and women’’.
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Luxembourg.4 In a 2002 Joint Declaration of Special Rapporteurs on
Women’s Rights, it was noted that:
‘‘Violence against women and girls is perpetrated in every country in the
world. This occurs in situations of peace and conflict. However, the State
agents and private actors responsible are not held to account. This climate
of impunity encourages the persistence of such violations’’.5
As the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has pointed out,
although slavery was officially abolished more than 150 years ago,
‘‘domestic slavery’’ persists in Europe and concerns thousands of people,
the majority of whom are women.6 This is also true in other jurisdictions.
In Africa, for example, the consequences of slavery still persist in some
states such as Mauritania to the detriment of women.7 In every state where
data is available, for example, notwithstanding favourable legislation,
women’s average wages are less than those of men regardless of education,8
and women experience the onus of the ‘‘double duty’’.9 Over 60 per cent of
those working in family enterprises without pay are women.10 Women are
often subjected to discriminatory employment practices such as the
requirement to present a non-pregnancy certificate to gain employment
4 CESCR Concluding Observations: Luxembourg E/C.12/1/Add 86 (23 May 2003) at para 22: ‘‘The
Committee notes with concern that women are still underrepresented in the work
force. While taking note that the disparities between wages of men and women have
been reduced, the Committee also notes with concern that the current level of wage
difference (women receiving 15 per cent lower wages than men) remains a matter of
concern’’.
5 United Nations, Joint Declaration of Special Rapporteurs on Women’s Rights, 8
March 2002, available at: ,http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2002/wom1330.
doc.htm.. The Declaration was made by Ms Marta Altolaguirre, special rapporteur
on women’s rights, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; Ms Radhika
Coomaraswamy, special rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and its
consequences, UN Commission on Human Rights; and Ms Angela Melo, special
rapporteur on the rights of women in Africa, African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights.
6 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Siliadin v France Appl No 73316/01 (judgment
of 26 July 2005) at para 111.
7 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Bah Ould Rabah v
Mauritania Communication 197/97 (2005) 12 International Human Rights Reports 872 at
para 29.
8 UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) Progress of the World’s Women (2000, United
Nations) at 92.
9 AM Cotter Gender Injustice: An International Comparative Analysis of Equality in Employment
(2004, Ashgate Press) at 93–215. ‘‘Double duty’’ refers to the reality that women
worldwide who join the paid labour force nevertheless continue to shoulder more
than their fair share of household and family responsibilities.
10 See United Nations The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005 (2005, United Nations) at
16, available at: ,http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/pdf/MDG%20Book.pdf. (last accessed
21 March 2006), noting that: ‘‘In the home, women perform most of the chores. This
work is also unpaid, often little valued and not reflected in national production
statistics’’.
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or to avoid dismissal from employment.11 Thus, notwithstanding compre-
hensive international and domestic laws proscribing sex discrimination
and promoting equality, women’s human rights are ‘‘systematically
denied’’12 and ‘‘women [are] poorer than men across class, race, national,
economic and ethnic lines’’.13 It is not surprising that women are generally
‘‘over-represented in low-paid employment’’.14 Despite significant achieve-
ments in thequest forwomen’s equality, and inparticular the entry into force
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women(CEDAW)15whichwasacceptedby185statesbyOctober2006, ensuring
gender equality in all states remains an enormous challenge.16
This article examines the relationship between culture and the realiza-
tion of the human rights of women in Africa. As space does not permit, the
intention is not to address all cultural issues, but to consider some cultural
obstacles and threats that have caused major difficulties. Although African
states have ratified several human rights instruments protecting women’s
human rights, generally the severe political, economic and social difficul-
ties facing African states have had a negative impact on the efforts to
respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of women. The prevalence of
prejudicial traditional practices and customs that legitimize women’s
inequality in rural areas of most African states hamper the effective
implementation of human rights generally, and of women as a vulnerable
group in particular. Although obstacles to the realization of both the civil
and political rights (CPR) and the economic, social and cultural rights
(ESCR) of women, traditional practices and customs disproportionately
affect ESCR since traditionally this category of rights has been often
marginalized rather than prioritized.17 Most violations of ESCR (for
11 CESCR Concluding Observations: Mexico Future E/C12/CO/MEX/4 (17 May 2006) at para 15:
‘‘The Committee reiterates its concern about the practice of employers in the
maquiladora (textile) industry to require women to present non-pregnancy certificates
in order to be hired or to avoid being dismissed’’.
12 Human Rights Watch ‘‘Women’s rights in Middle East and North Africa’’, available at:
,http:www.hrw.org/women/overview-mena.html. (accessed 17 March 2006). See also
Amnesty International Human Rights for Human Dignity: A Primer on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (2005, Amnesty International Publications) at 50–51.
13 Cotter Gender Injustice, above at note 9 at 273 (footnote omitted).
14 CESCR Concluding Observations: Liechtenstein Future E/C.12/CO/LIE/1 (19 May 2006) at
para 13.
15 GA res 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp (No 46) at 193, UN Doc A/34/4.
16 United Nations Press Release ‘‘High Commissioner for Human Rights points to
challenges andopportunities in promotingwomen’s rights’’ (8March 2006), available at:
,http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/754BA777E8ACE0A6C125712B00
4B0387?opendocument. (accessed 12 March 2006). See also R Rebouche ‘‘Labour, land,
and women’s rights in Africa: challenges for the new Protocol on the Rights of
Women’’ (2006) 19HarvardHumanRights Journal 235.
17 See, eg, J Oloka-Onyango ‘‘Reinforcing marginalized rights in the age of globalization:
international mechanisms, non-state actors and the struggle for peoples’ rights in
Africa’’ (2003) 18/4 American University International Law Review 851; S Skogly ‘‘Crimes
against humanity-revisited: is there a role for economic and social rights’’ (2001) 5/1
International Journal of Human Rights 58.
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example, the right to education which plays ‘‘a vital role in empowering
women’’ to participate fully in their communities)18 often continue
unchallenged since they are regarded as not justiciable and thus ‘‘not-
quite-rights’’.19 The overwhelming majority of children deprived of basic
education and illiterate adults are female.20 In Togo, for example, there is
an extremely high rate of illiteracy among women, which in 1998 stood at
60.5 per cent in the rural areas and 27.6 per cent in the urban areas.21 The
denial of women’s ESCR in turn undermines women’s ability to enjoy their
CPR, which then limits women’s capacity to influence decision and policy
making in public life.22 This article concludes with observations and
recommendations to address these obstacles so that African states comply
with their domestic, regional and international human rights obligations
relating to the protection and promotion of women’s human rights.
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW
In view of the fact that all human beings are born ‘‘free and equal in dignity
and rights’’,23 the principles of non-discrimination and equality represent
the ‘‘twin pillars’’ upon which the whole edifice of human rights law is
established.24 These two principles are included in various international
and regional human rights instruments.25 The main women’s human
rights instruments in Africa – most notably the African Charter on Human
18 CESCR General Comment 13: The Right to Education (21st session, 1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/
10 (1999) at para 1.
19 K Tomasevki ‘‘Has the right to education a future within the United Nations? A behind-
the-scenes account by the special rapporteur on the right to education 1998–2004’’
(2005) 5/2 Human Rights Law Review 205 at 216, noting that: ‘‘As the Cold War has not
ended as yet within the [UN Commission on Human Rights], economic, social and
cultural rights are still a casualty’’.
20 K Watkins The Oxfam Education Report (2000, Oxfam) at 3: ‘‘Two-thirds of the children not
in school – and a similar proportion of adults who are illiterate – are female’’.
21 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Togo CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/3 (3 February 2006) at paras 24–
25. Togo’s Ministry of Education circular No 8478/MEN-RS prohibits pregnant school-
girls or students from attending school. This partly accounts for the high dropout rate
of girls and their low enrolment rates in higher education owing to pregnancy and
early and forced marriage.
22 See ‘‘Montreal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’’ (2004) 26
Human Rights Quarterly 760 at 763 [hereinafter Montreal Principles].
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948)
[herein after UDHR], art 1.
24 See J Rehman International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (2003, Pearson
Education) at 269; A McColgan ‘‘Principles of equality and protection from
discrimination in international human rights law’’ (2003) 2 European Human Rights
Law Review at 157; M MacEwen ‘‘Comparative non-discrimination law: an overview’’
in T Loenen and P Rodrigues (eds) Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives
(1999, Kluwer) 427.
25 See, eg, The United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153,
entered into force 24 October 1945, art 1(3); UDHR, art 2; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, GA res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 52, UN Doc
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and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter ACHPR or the Charter),26 and the Protocol to
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa (hereafter African Women’s Rights Protocol or the Protocol)27 –
prohibit discrimination and protect the equal enjoyment of the rights of
men and women.28
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the rights of
women in Africa
The ACHPR contains four main provisions protecting women against
discrimination. First is the general non-discrimination clause contained
in article 2 of the Charter, which states that: ‘‘Every individual shall be
entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as …
sex’’. Secondly, this is reinforced by article 3 which deals with equal
protection in the following terms: ‘‘1. Every individual shall be equal before
the law. 2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law’’.
Thirdly, for the avoidance of doubt, article 18(3), which generally deals with
the protection of the family, states: ‘‘The State shall ensure the elimination
of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of
the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international
declarations and conventions’’. Finally, article 60 states that the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) will
draw inspiration from international human rights instruments (such as
CEDAW).
A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR], arts
2(1) and 26; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA res
2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, entered
into force 3 January 1976 [hereinafter ICESCR], arts 2(2) and 3; International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, GA res 2106 (XX), Annex, 20
UN GAOR Supp (No 14) at 47, UN Doc A/6014 (1966), 660 UNTS 195, entered into force 4
January 1969 [hereinafter ICERD], art 1(1); CEDAW, above at note 15 at art 1; [European]
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS
222, entered into force 3 September 1953 [hereinafter ECHR] art 14; American
Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 36, 1144 UNTS 123, entered into
force 18 July 1978 [hereinafter AMCHR] art 1; African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), entered
into force 21 October 1986 [hereinafter ACHPR] art 2; Commonwealth of Independent
States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CIS Convention)
(1995), available at ,http://hei.unige.ch/,clapham/hrdoc/docs/CIS%20convention.
doc.; art 20(2); League of Arab States, Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, 22
May 2004, reprinted in (2005) 12 International Human Rights Reports 893, art 3.
26 ACHPR, above at note 25. For the analysis, see C Heyns ‘‘The African regional human
rights system: the African Charter’’ (2004) 108 Penn State Law Review 679.
27 Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Maputo, on
11 July 2003; reprinted in 1 African Human Rights Law Journal 40, entered into force 25
November 2005.
28 ACHPR arts 2, 3 and 18(3).
contd
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However, the above provisions do not adequately address the human
rights of women in Africa. For example, while article 18 prohibits
discrimination against women, it does so only in the context of the family.
In addition, explicit provisions guaranteeing the right of consent to
marriage and equality of spouses during and after marriage are absent.
These omissions are compounded by the fact that the Charter places
emphasis on traditional African values and traditions without addressing
concerns that many customary practices, such as female genital mutilation,
forced marriage and wife inheritance, can be harmful or life threatening to
women. According to article 18(2) of the Charter: ‘‘The State shall have the
duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional
values recognised by the community’’. Under article 29(7), an individual has
a duty ‘‘to preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his
relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance,
dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion
of the moral well being of society’’. By ignoring critical issues such as
custom and marriage, it has been argued that the Charter inadequately
protects women’s human rights.29 It is against this background that, during
its 23rd Session held in April 1998, the African Commission endorsed the
appointment of the first Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in
Africa (SRRWA) with a mandate that includes working towards the adoption
and ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of
Women in Africa.30
The scope of ‘‘positive African cultural values’’ is subject to debate. Beyani
argues that article 29(7) cannot be interpreted as trumping the non-
discrimination provisions in the Charter.31 Taken in its totality as a human
rights treaty, it is arguable that the ‘‘positive African cultural values’’
described in the Charter are those that are consonant with principles of
equality and non-discrimination. In this respect, a ‘‘progressive and liberal
construction of the Charter seems to leave no room for the discriminatory
treatment of women’’.32 The adoption by the African Commission, in Legal
Resources Foundation v Zambia, of the definition of discrimination drawn by
the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) in General Comment 18,
which is itself based on CEDAW article 1 and CERD article 1, suggests that
29 M Wandia ‘‘Rights of women in Africa: launch of petition to the African Union’’ (June
2004), available at ,http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/1944.html. (accessed
26 July 2006).
30 ACHPR, Special Rapporteur on Women’s Rights: Resolution and Mandate, available at:
,http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/index_women_en.html#1. (accessed 26 June
2006); F Banda ‘‘Blazing a trail: the African Protocol on Women’s Rights comes into
force’’ (2006) 50/1 Journal of African Law 72.
31 C Beyani ‘‘Toward a more effective guarantee of women’s rights in the African human
rights system’’ in R Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International
Perspectives (1994, University of Pennsylvania Press) 285.
32 M Mutua ‘‘The African human rights system: a critical evaluation’’, available at:,http://
hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background_papers/MUTUA.PDF. at 9 (last accessed
14 November 2006).
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there can be no derogation of the equality principle, not even for culture.33
Finally, the African Commission guidelines to states on reporting, which
encompass both public and private sphere violations, are based on CEDAW
reporting guidelines.34
Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa
The Protocol was adopted on 11 July 2003 during the Second Ordinary
Heads of States and Governments Summit held in Maputo, Mozambique. It
had taken eight years for the draft text of this critical new human rights
instrument for African women to be adopted. On 25th November 2005, the
Protocol came into force having received the required 15 ratifications. By
February 2006, nearly three years after the adoption of the Protocol, only 17
(out of 53) African states had ratified the Protocol.35 The reluctance to ratify
the Protocol is itself indicative of the state of women’s human rights in
Africa. However, human rights instruments in Africa have historically taken
a long time to be ratified and enter into force due to the lack of political
will. The ACHPR, adopted in 1981, only came into force five years later in
1986; the Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights36 came into force in 2004, six years after its adoption in 1998; and the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,37 which was
adopted in 1990, took nine years to come into force.
The Protocol protects the civil and political rights of women, their
economic, social and cultural rights and also their collective rights.38 Apart
from re-emphasizing and extending UN instruments on human rights of
women, the Protocol enshrines the mainstreaming of human rights and
gender equality in African affairs,39 an objective and principle of the
African Union (AU).40 The specific rights protected under the Protocol are,
broadly, the rights to: non-discrimination (article 2); dignity (article 3); life,
33 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Legal Resources Foundation v
Zambia Comm No 211/98, Decisions on Communications Brought before the African
Commission, 29th Ordinary Session (Tripoli, May 2001) para 63; HRC General Comment
18, Non-discrimination (37th session, 1989) UN Doc HRI\GEN\1\Rev1 (1994) at 26.
34 F Viljoen ‘‘State reporting under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: a
boost from the South’’ (2000) 44/1 Journal of African Law 110.
35 These were Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Libya, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi,
Mozambique, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal and Togo.
36 9 June 1998, OAU Doc OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III).
37 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999.
38 See M Ssenyonjo ‘‘Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa: introductory note’’ (2004) 11 International Human Rights
Reports 859; M Baderin ‘‘Recent developments in the African regional human rights
system’’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 117; Banda ‘‘Blazing a trail’’, above at note 30.
39 VO Nmehielle ‘‘Development of the African human rights system in the last decade’’
(2004) 11(3) Human Rights Brief 6.
40 Constitutive Act of the African Union OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15, entered into force 26 May
2001, art 3(h) states: ‘‘The objectives of the Union shall be to: Promote and protect
human and peoples’ rights’’; art 4(1)(l) provides: ‘‘The Union shall function in
accordance with the following principles: Promotion of gender equality’’.
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integrity and security of the person (article 4); equal right in a marriage
separation, divorce or annulment of marriage (articles 6–7); access to justice
and equal protection before the law (article 8); participation in the political
and decision-making process (article 9); peace (article 10); protection of
women in armed conflicts (article 11); education and training (article 12);
economic and social welfare rights (article 13); health and reproductive
rights including a woman’s right to have ‘‘medical abortion in cases of
sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the continued pregnancy endangers
the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or
the foetus’’ (article 14);41 food security (article 15); adequate housing (article
16); to live in a ‘‘positive cultural context’’ (article 17); a healthy and
sustainable environment (article 18); sustainable development (article 19);
widows’ rights (article 20); inheritance (article 21); the special protection of
elderly women (article 22), women with disabilities (article 23), and women
in distress (article 24).
Article 26 of the Protocol states the obligations of the state parties in the
following terms:
‘‘1. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of this Protocol at
national level, and in their periodic reports submitted in accordance
with Article 62 of the African Charter, indicate the legislative and other
measures undertaken for the full realisation of the rights herein
recognised.
2. States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures and in
particular shall provide budgetary and other resources for the full
and effective implementation of the rights herein recognised’’.
In particular, article 5 of the Protocol obliges states parties to take all
‘‘necessary legislative’’ and ‘‘other measures’’ to eliminate harmful
practices which negatively affect the human rights of women and which
are contrary to recognized international standards, including:
"a. creation of public awareness in all sectors of society regarding harmful
practices through information, formal and informal education and
outreach programmes;
b. prohibition, through legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all
forms of female genital mutilation, scarification, medicalisation and
para-medicalisation of female genital mutilation and all other practices
in order to eradicate them;
c. provision of necessary support to victims of harmful practices through
basic services such as health services, legal and judicial support,
emotional and psychological counselling as well as vocational training
to make them self-supporting;
41 See also HRC Karen Noelia Llantoy Huama´n v Peru Communication No 1153/2003, UN Doc
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005).
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d. protection of women who are at risk of being subjected to harmful
practices or all other forms of violence, abuse and intolerance’’.
Unlike some treaties (such as the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court),42 it is noteworthy that the Protocol does not provide
expressly that reservations or declarations are not permitted. While this
position was adopted to secure wider ratification of the Protocol by African
states who consider that they have difficulties in guaranteeing all the rights
in the Protocol but can nonetheless accept the generality of obligations in
that instrument, it is likely that states would make reservations similar to
those made by various African states to CEDAW.43 For example, the
reservations to CEDAW made by Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Mauritania and Morocco specifically referred to the traditional male-
centred interpretations of Islamic law (shari’a) provisions.44 In particular,
Egypt’s reservation to article 16 of CEDAW, concerning the equality of men
and women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations during
the marriage and upon its dissolution, states:
‘‘The provisions of the shari’a lay down that the husband shall pay bridal
money to the wife and maintain her fully and shall also make a payment to
her upon divorce, whereas the wife retains full rights over her property and
is not obliged to spend anything on her keep. The shari’a therefore restricts
the wife’s rights to divorce by making it contingent on a judge’s ruling,
whereas no such restriction is laid down in the case of the husband’’.45
The CEDAW Committee has urged states to expedite the steps necessary for
the withdrawal of reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of
the Convention.46 In particular, the Committee’s view is that articles 2 and 16
of CEDAWare central to theobject andpurpose of theConvention and that, in
accordance with article 28, paragraph 2, they should be withdrawn.47
42 UN Doc 2187 UNTS 90, entered into force 1 July 2002. Art 120 provides: ‘‘No reservations
may be made to this Statute’’.
43 For specific reservations by state, see ,http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
reservations-country.htm. (last visited 17 July 2006).
44 Ibid. The primary sources of Islamic law are the Qur’an (a religious text considered
by Muslims to be revealed by God) and Sunnah (reported sayings and practices of
Prophet Muhammad, pbuh). Other secondary sources include ijma (consensus
among Muslim jurists regarding questions of shari’a), Qiyas (drawing analogy from
the essence of divine principles) and ijtihad (exercising of independent juristic
reasoning). See S Ali Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law: Equal
before Allah, Unequal before Man? (2000, Kluwer Law International) 19–23; A Khan
‘‘The reopening of the Islamic Code: the second era of Ijtihad’’ (2003) 1 University of
St. Thomas Law Journal 341.
45 See note 43 above.
46 See the CEDAW Committee’s statement on reservations in the report on the 19th
session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 38 (A/53/38/
Rev 1) part 2 at chap I.
47 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Egypt CEDAW A/56/38 (2001) at para 327.
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However, states have continued to observe these reservations in practice and
thus violate human rights of women.
The absence of an explicit clause prohibiting reservations in the Protocol
to the ACHPR does not safeguard against the state practice of entering such
reservations. In accordance with article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties,48 a state may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving
or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless the reservation is
prohibited by the treaty; the treaty provides that only specified reserva-
tions, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or
where the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty.49 The implication is that if a treaty is silent on the issue of
reservations, they are allowed although the absence of a prohibition on
reservations does not mean that any reservation is permitted. With respect
to the African Protocol on Women’s Rights, it was suggested by the
Southern African Development Community member states (SADC group)
that reservations should be expressly prohibited, but this suggestion was
not taken up.50 In a ‘‘standard-setting’’ instrument, which articulates the
human rights of women, each of the many articles, and indeed their
interplay, secures the objectives of the Protocol. As stated in the preamble
to the Protocol, the Protocol is intended ‘‘to ensure that the rights of
women are promoted, realised and protected in order to enable them to
enjoy fully all their human rights’’. Clearly then, the object and purpose of
the Protocol is to create legally binding standards for women’s human
rights by defining certain civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights of women, and to place them in a framework of obligations which
are legally binding for those states which ratify, and to provide an
efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken.51 The
provisions in the Protocol that represent customary international law (and
a fortiori when they have the character of peremptory norms) may not be the
subject of reservations as such reservations would not be compatible with
the object and purpose of the Protocol.52 For example, a reservation to the
obligation to combat all forms of discrimination against women (article 2)
48 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679, entered into force 27 January 1980.
49 See A Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000, Cambridge University Press) at 108–12.
50 F Banda Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective (2005, Hart Publishing) at
75–79.
51 See also HRC General Comment 24 (52), General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations
Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in
Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add6
(1994), para 7.
52 Id at para 8, noting that under the ICCPR: ‘‘[A] State may not reserve the right to engage
in slavery, to torture, to subject persons to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, to arbitrarily deprive persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and
detain persons, to deny freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to presume a
person guilty unless he proves his innocence, to execute pregnant women or children,
to permit the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of
marriageable age the right to marry, or to deny to minorities the right to enjoy their
own culture, profess their own religion, or use their own language’’.
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would not be acceptable. Nor may a state reserve an entitlement not to take
the necessary steps at the domestic level to give effect to the rights of the
Protocol (article 26).53
The state of women’s rights in Africa in practice
Every state in Africa is a party to at least one international treaty
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in the enjoyment of human
rights or a party to an international treaty providing for the equal rights of
men and women to the enjoyment of all human rights. Despite this, it is
essential to note:
‘‘Women are often denied equal enjoyment of their human rights, in
particular by virtue of the lesser status ascribed to them by tradition and
custom, or as a result of overt or covert discrimination. Many women
experience distinct forms of discrimination due to the intersection of sex
with such factors as race, colour, language, religion, political and other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status, such as
age, ethnicity, disability, marital, refugee or migrant status, resulting in
compounded disadvantage’’.54
For example, persons with mental disabilities are often subjected to human
rights abuses including: rape and sexual abuse; forced sterilizations; being
chained to soiled beds for long periods of time, and, in some cases being
held inside cages; violence and torture; the administration of treatment
without informed consent; grossly inadequate sanitation; and a lack of
food.55 However, women with mental disabilities are especially vulnerable
to forced sterilization and sexual violence, a violation of their sexual and
reproductive health rights.56 Moreover, women with disabilities belonging
to ethnic and racial minorities often experience compounded disadvantage
due to the intersection of sex with ethnicity and race although this has been
historically neglected.57 This is because ‘‘[c]ertain forms of racial discrimi-
nation may be directed towards women specifically because of their gender,
such as sexual violence committed against women members of particular
racial or ethnic groups in detention or during armed conflict; the coerced
53 Id at para 9.
54 CESCR General Comment No. 16 E/C12/2005/4 (2005) at para 5.
55 P Hunt Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health E/CN 4/2005/51 (11 February 2005) at para
9.
56 Id at para 12; KL Raye Women’s Rights Advocacy Initiative: Violence, Women, and Mental
Disability (1999, Mental Disability Rights International); L Dowse and C Frohmader
Moving Forward: Sterilization and Reproductive Health of Women and Girls with Disabilities
(2001, Women with Disabilities, Australia).
57 CESCR General Comment No. 5, Persons with Disabilities (11th session, 1994) UN Doc E/1995/
22 at 19 (1995) at para 19 stating: ‘‘Persons with disabilities are sometimes treated as
genderless human beings. As a result, the double discrimination suffered by women
with disabilities is often neglected’’.
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sterilization of indigenous women; abuse of women workers in the
informal sector or domestic workers employed abroad by their employ-
ers’’.58
In Libya, for example, there are ‘‘numerous reports about the existence of
racial prejudices against Black Africans, which on some occasions has led to
acts of violence against them’’.59 Women have been the worst victims since
the human rights of women are often subordinated to rigid social norms
condoned and reinforced by the Libyan government.60 Consequently, there
are circumstances in which discrimination (on grounds of disability or
race) only or primarily affects women, or affects women in a different way,
or to a different degree than men. For example, women often have less
access to education and healthcare than men which compromises their
opportunities for employment and advancement.61 In Botswana, women
‘‘refugees have access neither to the Anti Retroviral (ARV) Therapy
Programme nor the Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission of [the]
HIV Programme’’.62 Therefore, despite the ratification of human rights
instruments by the majority of African states, women in Africa still
continue to be ‘‘victims of discrimination and harmful practices’’ which
violate their human rights.63 One of the key obstacles to the realization of
women’s human rights in Africa is deeply-rooted in culture.
PREJUDICIAL CULTURAL PRACTICES AND CUSTOMS AS AN
OBSTACLE TO THE REALIZATION OF WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
IN AFRICA
African culture in general
Anthropologists commonly use the term ‘‘culture’’ to refer to a society or
group in which many people live and think in the same ways.64 Culture
includes ‘‘inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute
the shared bases of social action’’.65 In this respect, culture is a
macroconcept, which subsumes religion as an aspect of culture.66
Although a number of African states have ratified treaties which
guarantee the equality of men and women and have incorporated the
58 CERD General Recommendation No. 25: Gender Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination: 20/
03/2000, A/55/18, Annex V at para 2.
59 CESCR Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya E/C12/LYB/CO/2 (25 January 2006) at
para 12.
60 Human Rights Watch Libya: A Threat to Society? Arbitrary Detention of Women and Girls for
‘‘Social Rehabilitation’’ (February 2006) Vol 18, No 2(E), available at: ,http://hrw.org/
reports/2006/libya0206/..
61 CESCR General comment No. 18: The Right to Work E/C12/GC/18 (6 February 2006) at
para 13.
62 CERD Concluding Observations: Botswana CERD/C/BWA/CO/16 (4 April 2006) at para 19.
63 African Women’s Rights Protocol, preamble at para 12.
64 F Raday, ‘‘Culture, religion, and gender’’ (2004) 1/4 International Journal of Constitutional
Law 663 at 665–66.
65 See Collins English Dictionary (1999, HarperCollins Publishers) at 385.
66 Raday ‘‘Culture, religion and gender’’, above at note 64 at 665.
50 | JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW VOL 51, NO 1
principles of equality and non-discrimination into national constitutions,
the persistence of deep-rooted adverse patriarchal attitudes and firmly
entrenched stereotypical behaviour with respect to the role of women and
men in the family and society limit the full implementation of the human
rights of women.67 The widespread and continuing existence of harmful
traditional practices in African states affect the equal right of men and
women to the enjoyment of all human rights.68 While it is acknowledged
that culture (as reflected in customary law in Africa) in some cases can
protect some of women’s human rights, the prevalence in Africa of certain
harmful traditions, customs and cultural practices leads to substantial
discrimination against women thereby preventing them from fully
exercising their human rights.69 Although ‘‘everyone’’ has a right to
cultural participation,70 including cultural rights of specific groups,71
African cultures and traditions as they presently exist are mainly made for
and by men!72 In Eritrea, for example, while participation in the National
Service creates eligibility for access to land and other economic resources,
women are exempt from the National Service on grounds of marriage, thus
losing eligibility for access to land and other resources.73 This perpetuates
women’s subordination in the family and society and constitutes serious
obstacles to women’s enjoyment of their human rights.
Some of these cultures are enforced through (criminal) legislation. In
Nigeria, for example, the Penal Code permits husbands to use physical
67 See, eg, CEDAW Concluding Observations: Mali CEDAW /C/MLI/CO/5 (3 February 2006) at
para 17; Egypt A/56/38 (2 February 2001) at para 325; Cameroon A/55/38 (26 June 2000)
at paras 53–54; Democratic Republic of Congo A/55/38 (1 February 2000) at paras 230–32;
Guinea A/56/38 (31 July 2001) at paras 122 and 138; United Republic of Tanzania A/53/38/
Rev1 (6 July 1998) at paras 229–30.
68 See, eg, CESCR Concluding Observations: Zambia E/C12/1/Add106 (23 June 2005) at para 10,
noting that ‘‘the persistence of customs and traditions harmful to women’’ is one of
the factors impeding the implementation of the ICESCR.
69 Id at paras 14, 23 and 32. In para 23, the CESCR was ‘‘concerned about the harsh living
conditions of widows and girl orphans due to, among other things, harmful
traditional practices such as ‘widow-cleansing’, early marriages and denial of
inheritance’’. Similarly, para 32 the CESCR noted that in Zambia ‘‘traditional attitudes
[against girl education] continue and that discrimination against girl children is
prevalent in the State party’’. See also Raday ‘‘Culture, religion and gender’’, above at
note 64 at 663–715.
70 See ICESCR art 15(1)(a); UDHR art 27(1) stating: ‘‘Everyone has the right freely to partici-
pate in the cultural life of the community’’; CERD art 5(e) (vi); the Additional Protocol
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) art 14; and ACHPR art 17(2).
71 See ICCPR art 27; CEDAW art 13 (c); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) GA
res 44/25, annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp (No 49) at 167, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), entered into
force 2 September 1990, art 31 and the International Convention on the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families GA res 45/158 of 18 December 1990,
entered into force 1 July 2003, art 31.
72 J Oloka-Onyango ‘‘Who’s watching ‘Big Brother’? Globalization and the protection of
cultural rights in present day Africa’’ 2005 (4) Human Rights Quarterly 1245 at 1268.
73 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Eritrea CEDAW/C/ERI/CO/3 (3 February 2006) at para 14.
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means to chastise their wives as long as it does not result in ‘‘grievous
harm’’, which is defined as loss of sight, hearing, power of speech, facial
disfigurement or life-threatening injuries.74 In more traditional areas of
Nigeria, the courts and police have been reluctant to intervene to protect
women who have formally accused their husbands of abuse if the level of
alleged abuse did not exceed the customary norms of those areas.75 This
denies women in Africa ‘‘the right to live in a positive cultural context and
to participate at all levels in the determination of cultural policies’’
affecting their lives.76 The right of everyone to cultural participation seeks
to encourage the active contribution of all members of society to the
progress of society as a whole. As such, it is intrinsically linked to, and is
dependent on the enjoyment of, other human rights such as the right to
own property alone as well as in association with others,77 the freedom of
expression including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds,78 the right to the full development of the human
personality79 and freedom of movement.80
Women are often denied travel documents just because they are female –
they are subjected to legal or de facto requirements which prevent them
from travelling, such as the requirement of consent of a third party to the
issuance of a passport or other type of travel documents to an adult woman.
One case from Libya demonstrates the effect of violations of women’s
freedom of movement on women’s enjoyment of other human rights. In
Loubna El Ghar v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,81 the author, of Libyan nationality,
had lived all her life in Morocco with her divorced mother and held a
residence permit for that country. As a student of French law at the Hassan
II University in Casablanca, she wished to continue her studies in France
and to specialize in international law. To that end, she applied to the Libyan
Consulate in Morocco for a passport beginning in 1998. In 2002, the Libyan
consul indicated to the author that it was not possible to issue her a
74 US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005, Nigeria (8 March
2006, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, available at
,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61586.htm. (accessed 18 March 2006). In
2003, 64.5% of women and 61.3% of men agreed that a husband was justified in hitting
or beating his wife for at least 1 of 6 specified reasons, including ‘‘burning food and not
cooking on time’’, see National Population Commission Nigeria Demographic and Health
Survey (2003, National Population Commission and ORC Macro), available at: ,http://
www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR148/00FrontMatter.pdf..
75 US Department of State Country Reports, above at note 74.
76 African Women’s Rights Protocol art 17(1).
77 See UDHR art 17; ICERD art 5 (d) (v); Protocol No 1 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights
- ECHR) art 1; the American Convention on Human Rights art 21; and ACHPR art 4.
78 See UDHR art 19; ICCPR art 19(2); ECHR art 5; the American Declaration on Human
Rights art 13 and ACHPR art 9.
79 See UDHR art 26(2); ICESCR art 13(1).
80 ICCPR art 12(2) provides: ‘‘Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own’’.
81 HRC Communication No. 1107/2002 (15 November 2004) CCPR/C/82/D/1107/2002.
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passport but that she could be given a laissez-passer (travel document) for
Libya, by virtue of a ‘‘regulation’’ that was explained neither orally nor
on the laissez-passer itself. The passport application submitted to the
Libyan Consulate was thus rejected without any explanation of the
grounds for the decision, the only comment being that since the author
‘‘is a native of Morocco and has not obtained a passport, this travel
document [laissez-passer] is issued to enable her to return to national
territory’’. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) considered that ‘‘this
laissez-passer cannot be considered a satisfactory substitute for a valid
Libyan passport that would enable the author to travel abroad’’.82 The
Committee concluded that ‘‘the facts before it disclose a violation of
article 12, paragraph 2, of the Covenant (ICCPR) insofar as the author was
denied a passport without any valid justification and subjected to an
unreasonable delay, and as a result was prevented from travelling abroad
to continue her studies’’.83 The Committee urged ‘‘the State party to issue
the author with a passport without further delay’’ and to ‘‘take effective
measures to ensure that similar violations do not recur in future’’.84 It is
clear that the refusal to issue a passport to a female student on the basis
of an ‘‘unwritten regulation’’ (ie apparently because the applicant was
female and she had no consent from a third party - her father) in this
case not only violated her freedom of movement (a civil and political
right), but also prevented her from travelling abroad for further studies
(a violation of the right to education – an economic, social and cultural
right).85
It is, therefore, not surprising that many features of customary law
in Africa effectively operate ‘‘against the dignity, welfare or interests of
women (and) undermine their status’’.86 Generally, it has been noted
that:
‘‘Traditional cultural practices reflect values and beliefs held by members of
a community for periods often spanning generations. Every social grouping
in the world has specific traditional cultural practices and beliefs, some of
which are beneficial to all members, while others are harmful to a specific
group, such as women. These harmful traditional practices include female
genital mutilation (FGM); forced feeding of women; early marriage; the
various taboos or practices which prevent women from controlling their
82 Id at para 7.2.
83 Id at para 8.
84 Id at para 9.
85 See also LE Chamblee ‘‘Rhetoric or rights?: When culture and religion bar girls’ right to
education’’ (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 1073.
86 Oloka-Onyango ‘‘Who’s watching ‘Big Brother’?’’, above at 72 at 1268, citing The
Constition of the Republic of Uganda (1995) arts 33(6) and 32(1); and cultural objective
no xxiv in the Preamble, which encourages the incorporation into aspects of Ugandan
life of all cultures and customary values consistent with fundamental rights and
freedoms and human dignity.
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own fertility; nutritional taboos and traditional birth practices; son
preference and its implications for the status of the girl child; female
infanticide; early pregnancy; and dowry price’’.87
In the African context, harmful traditional practices include ‘‘the practice
of female genital mutilation [FGM],88 as well as scarification and ritual
killing of children’’,89 corporal punishment (in the family, schools and
other institutions),90 the acceptance of domestic violence towards women,91
forced and/or early marriages,92 polygamy (more specifically, polygyny),
and the denial of inheritance rights to women.93 Many customary laws
discriminate against women in the areas of inheritance, marriage and
87 UNHCHR Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children Fact Sheet
No 23 (1995), available at: ,http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs23.htm#I..
88 K Bowman ‘‘Comment: bridging the gap in the hopes of ending female genital
cutting’’ (2005) III/I Santa Clara Journal of International Law 132; N Mendelsohn ‘‘At the
crossroads: the case for and against a cultural defense to female genital mutilaton’’
(2004) 56 Rutgers Law Review 1011; CESCR Concluding Observations: Egypt E/C.12/1/Add 44
(23 May 2000) at para 16: ‘‘The Committee further notes with concern that the
percentage of women who are victims of FGM remains alarmingly high: WHO statistics
for 1995 showed an estimated 97 per cent prevalence of FGM (‘Female Genital
Mutilation: An Overview’, WHO, Geneva, 1998, p. 13)’’; CEDAW Concluding Observations:
Eritrea CEDAW/C/ERI/CO/3 (3 February 2006) at para 18, stating that ‘‘the Committee is
concerned at the high incidence of female genital mutilation in the country and the
State party’s reluctance to expedite the adoption of legislation aimed at eradicating
this practice’’. In respect of Uganda, the CRC expressed its concern in 2005 that ‘‘FGM
is not specifically prohibited by law and is still widely practised in the State
party’’: see CRC Concluding Observations: Uganda CRC/C/UGA/CO/2 (23 November 2005) at
para 55.
89 Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Concluding Observations: Nigeria CRC/C/15/Add
257 (13 April 2005) at para 56.
90 In Nigeria, eg, the shari’a legal code to children prescribes ‘‘penalties and corporal
punishment such as flogging, whipping, stoning and amputation, which are
sometimes applied to children’’: see id at para 38(d). See also CRC Concluding
Observations: Uganda CRC/C/UGA/CO/2 (23 November 2005) at para 39, noting that:
‘‘While taking note that corporal punishment has been prohibited in schools by a
circular of the Ministry of Education, and in the penal system under the Children’s
Act, the Committee remains concerned that corporal punishment is still traditionally
accepted and widely practised in the family and in other settings’’; G Muhwezi
‘‘Teacher’s canes paralyse student’’ (30 July 2006) Sunday Monitor; and Global Initiative
to End All Corporal Punishment of Children Lawfulness of Corporal Punishment: Uganda
(May 2006), available at: ,http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/progress/
reports/uganda.html..
91 CRC Concluding Observations: Nigeria, above at note 89 at para 44. See also CG Bowman
‘‘Theories of domestic violence in the African context’’ (2003) 11 American University
Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 847.
92 CRC Concluding Observations: Nigeria, above at note 89 at para 54.
93 See, eg, The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) Bringing Equality Home:
Promoting and Protecting the Inheritance Rights of Women – A Survey of Law and Practice in
Sub-Saharan Africa (2004, COHRE); CESCR Concluding Observations: Senegal E/C.12/1/Add 62
(24 September 2001) at para 15, noting that discriminatory practices against women
and girls in Senegal include ‘‘polygamy, restricted access to land, property, housing
and credit facilities, and the inability to inherit land’’.
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divorce.94 These areas are, therefore, key to a deeper understanding of why
women in Africa do not enjoy their rights. Yet some states have only shown
limited efforts to address such discriminatory cultural practices and
stereotypes directly and maintain that ‘‘women themselves are primarily
responsible for changing their position of disadvantage’’.95 The next section
discusses random cases of violations of women’s rights in Africa, focusing
especially on (some) traditional customs in areas of polygyny and divorce.
Polygamous marriages
Some traditional practices in Africa are so firmly established that while they
are, from an international human rights perspective, generally considered
as contrary to women’s equality with men, they are recognized even in the
African Women’s Rights Protocol. One of the clearest examples is
polygamy,96 which, according to the Human Rights Committee (HRC),
discriminates against women and violates their dignity:
‘‘It should also be noted that equality of treatment with regard to the right
to marry implies that polygamy is incompatible with this principle.
Polygamy violates the dignity of women. It is an inadmissible discrimina-
tion against women. Consequently, it should be definitely abolished
wherever it continues to exist’’.97
Although the African Women’s Right Protocol prohibits discrimination
against women and guarantees women’s right to dignity,98 it recognizes
polygamy. Article 2(1) of the Protocol recognizes that ‘‘States Parties shall
combat all forms of discrimination against women through appropriate
legislative, institutional and other measures’’, and under article 2(2),
‘‘States Parties shall commit themselves to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of women and men through public education,
94 See, eg, PO Davies ‘‘Marriage, divorce, and inheritance laws in Sierra Leone and their
discriminatory effects on women’’ (2005) 12/3 Human Rights Brief 17; B Oppermann
‘‘The impact of legal pluralism on women’s status: an examination of marriage laws
in Egypt, South Africa, and the United States’’ (2006) 17 Hastings Women’s Law Journal
65.
95 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Togo CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/3 (3 February 2006) at para 14.
96 In this article, polygamy has been used to mean polygyny, meaning having two or more
wives.
97 HRC General Comment No. 28, Equality of Rights Between Men and Women (Article 3) UN Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add 10 (2000) at para 24. See also HRC Concluding Observations: Algeria UN
Doc CCPR/C/79/Add95 (1998) at para 13; id Cameroon UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add 116 (1999)at
para 10; id Gambia UN Doc CCPR/CO/75/GMB (2004) at para 18; id Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add 101 (1998) at para 17; id Nigeria UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add 65 (1996)
at para 25; id Senegal UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add 82 (1997) at para 12.
98 African Women’s Rights Protocol art 3(1): ‘‘Every woman shall have the right to dignity
inherent in a human being and to the recognition and protection of her human and
legal rights’’.
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information, education and communication strategies, with a view to
achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional practices and
all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and
men’’.
More specifically, under article 5, ‘‘States Parties shall prohibit and
condemn all forms of harmful practices which negatively affect the human
rights of women and which are contrary to recognized international
standards’’. One would have expected such prohibited harmful cultural and
traditional practices to include polygamy. Nevertheless, with respect to
polygamy, the Protocol simply states in article 6(c):
‘‘States Parties shall ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights and are
regarded as equal partners in marriage. They shall enact appropriate
national legislative measures to guarantee that: monogamy is encouraged
as the preferred form of marriage and that the rights of women in marriage
and family, including in polygamous marital relationships are promoted
and protected’’.
This might be seen as being consistent with the ACHPR, which makes it a
‘‘duty’’ of the state and the individual to promote and protect the morals
and ‘‘traditional/cultural values’’ recognized by the community.99 Clearly
then, African states parties to the Protocol are only obliged to ‘‘encourage’’
monogamy. This is a weaker obligation since, in its ordinary and natural
meaning, the obligation to ‘‘encourage’’ only extends to ‘‘inspire with the
courage or confidence’’.100 The obligation is not to eliminate polygamy
immediately. During the drafting of the African Women’s Protocol, there
was a vigorous debate on whether polygyny should be abolished. While
non-governmental organizations demanded its abolition, government
experts actively resisted its abolition because ‘‘Shari’a and many customary
personal law systems recognized the rights of men to marry more than one
wife’’ and that its abolition would result in ‘‘hardship being suffered by
women already in polygynous unions’’.101 It is recognized under the
Protocol that it is possible to ‘‘promote’’ and ‘‘respect’’ women’s rights in
polygamous marital relationships, although it is less clear as to how this
can be achieved in practice. By implication, therefore, polygamy under the
Protocol is not seen as one of those practices which violate the dignity of
women or as inadmissible discrimination against women (at least in the
short-term).
99 ACHPR art 17(2): ‘‘The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custo-
dian of morals and traditional values recognised by the community’’. See also ACHPR
art 29(7).
100 See Collins English Dictionary (1999, HarperCollins Publishers) at 510.
101 Banda ‘‘Blazing a Trail’’, above at note 30 at 77.
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Given the fact that polygyny in Africa is deeply entrenched, it is
considered to be very difficult to ban it outright, and if it was banned it
might cause harm to the many women living in these relationships, whose
only protection at the moment might be provisions of the impugned
customary law. Therefore, it was seen as a necessary compromise measure,
reflecting the realities of the situation in Africa and the difficulties involved
in agreeing to a regional human rights treaty on women’s human rights.
This is especially the case given the fact that some states in Africa (for
example, Egypt and Sudan) apply aspects of shari’a law interpreted by
some scholars as permitting a man to marry up to four women.102 Such
interpretation of the Quran has been contested on the basis that the Quran
‘‘never discriminates on the basis of gender. It is the interpretation of the
Quran, reflecting masculine and patriarchal prejudices of the interpreters,
that is discriminatory’’.103 The recognition of polygamy is difficult to
reconcile with the above view of the HRC and the following view of the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women:
‘‘Polygamous marriage contravenes a woman’s right to equality with men,
and can have such serious emotional and financial consequences for her
and her dependants that such marriages ought to be discouraged and
prohibited. The Committee notes with concern that some states parties,
whose constitutions guarantee equal rights, permit polygamous marriage
in accordance with personal or customary law. This violates the constitu-
tional rights of women, and breaches the provisions of article 5 (a) of the
Convention’’.104
Article 5(a) of the CEDAW,105 ratified by several African states and which is
substantially similar to article 2(2) of the African Women’s Rights Protocol,
provides:
‘‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: To modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which
102 A Mashhour ‘‘Islamic law and gender equality – could there be a common ground?:
a study of divorce and polygamy in sharia law and contemporary legislation in
Tunisia and Egypt’’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 562; J Allain and A O’Shea
‘‘African disunity: comparing human rights law and practice of north and south
African states’’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 86; W Amien ‘‘Overcoming the
conflict between the right to freedom of religion and women’s rights to equality:
a South African case study of muslim marriages’’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly
729.
103 N Shah ‘‘Women’s human rights in the Koran: an interpretive approach’’ (2006) 28/4
Human Rights Quarterly 868 at 903.
104 CEDAW General Recommendation 21, Equality in Marriage and Family Relations (13th session,
1992) UN Doc A/49/38 at 1 (1994) at para 14.
105 GA res 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp (No 46) at 193, UN Doc A/34/46, entered into force 3
September 1981.
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are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women’’.
Since polygamy violates CEDAW article 5(a), it is submitted that the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Court), which under article 27 of
the African Women’s Rights Protocol is ‘‘seized with matters of interpreta-
tion arising from the application or implementation of this [Women’s
Rights] Protocol’’,106 should similarly interpret polygamy as violating
article 2(2) of the Protocol. This would generally be consistent with the
view that the ‘‘Court shall apply the provision of the Charter and any other
relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned’’107
without prejudice to ‘‘more favourable provisions for the realisation of the
rights of women contained in the national legislation of States Parties or in
any other regional, continental or international conventions’’.108 As noted
above, under article 60 of the African Charter, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) and arguably the Court,
since it complements the protective mandate of the African Commission,109
are required to draw inspiration from international law on human rights
instruments ratified by African states. Such instruments, undoubtedly,
include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women.
It follows, therefore, that under this approach, the obligation to
‘‘encourage’’ must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the
raison d’etre, of the Protocol, which is to establish clear human rights
obligations for states parties in respect of the full realization of the human
rights of women. The increasingly high standard being required in the area
of human rights protection correspondingly and inevitably requires
greater firmness in assessing breaches of equality and non-discrimination
as the fundamental values of democratic societies. Therefore, the Court
should regard the Protocol as a ‘‘living instrument which must be
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’’.110 As noted above, this
is ‘‘to ensure that the rights of women are promoted, realised and protected in
106 The first judges of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights were elected on 22
January 2006 at the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African
Union, held in Khartoum, Sudan. These are: Fatsah Ouguergouz (Algeria); Jean Emile
Somda (Burkina Faso); Gerard Niyungeko (Burundi); Sophia AB Akuffo (Ghana);
Kellelo Justina Masafo-Guni (Lesotho); Hamdi Faraj Fanoush (Libya); Modibo Tounty
Guindo (Mali); Jean Mutsinzi (Rwanda); El Hadji Guisse´ (Senegal); Bernard Ngoepe
(South Africa); and George W Kanyeihamba (Uganda).
107 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment
of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 9 June 1998, OAU Doc OAU/LEG/
EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) art 6.
108 African Women’s Right Protocol art 31.
109 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment
of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights art 2.
110 A similar approach has been used by the European Court of Human Rights in inter-
preting the ECHR. See, eg, Selmouni v France Appl 25803/94, judgment of 28 July 1999
(2000) 29 EHRR 403 at para 101.
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order to enable them to enjoy fully all their human rights’’.111 Three
specific obligations arise here – protect, promote and realize.
The obligation to protect requires states parties to take steps aimed
directly at the elimination of prejudices, customary and all other practices
that perpetuate the notion of inferiority or superiority of either of the
sexes, and stereotyped roles for men and women.112 The obligation of states
parties to protect under the Protocol includes, inter alia, the respect and
adoption of constitutional and legislative provisions on the equal right of
men and women to enjoy all human rights and the prohibition of
discrimination of any kind; the adoption of legislation to eliminate
discrimination and to prevent third parties or private actors (individuals,
groups, corporations and other entities as well as agents acting under their
authority) from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of
women’s human rights;113 the adoption of administrative measures and
programmes, as well as the establishment of public institutions, agencies
and programmes, to protect women against discrimination.114
States parties have an obligation to monitor and regulate the conduct of
non-state actors (NSAs) to ensure that they do not violate the equal right of
men and women to enjoy civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights.115 This obligation applies, for example, in cases where public
services have been partially or fully privatized,116 or where armed rebels –
such as the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda – violate human
rights including subjecting women to rape or sexual slavery.117
111 African Women’s Right Protocol preamble at para 14 (emphasis added).
112 CESCR General Comment No. 16, above at note 54 at para 19.
113 See The Social and Economic Rights Action Center & the Center for Economic and Social Rights/
Nigeria Communication 155/96 at para 44; Union des Jeunes Avocats v Chad
Communication 74/92 (ACmHPR); X and Y v Netherlands 91 ECHR (1985) (Ser A) at 32
(ECtHR); Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras judgment of 19 July 1988, Series C, No 4
(IACtHR) holding that a state has a positive duty to prevent human rights violations
occurring in the territory subject to its effective control, even if such violations are
carried out by third parties.
114 CESCR General Comment No. 16, above at note 54 at para 19; African Women’s Rights
Protocol art 2.
115 CESCR General Comment No. 16, above at note 54 at para 20; M. Sssenyonjo ‘‘Non-State
Actors and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’’ in M Baderin and R McCorquodale
(eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (2007, Oxford University Press) chap 6.
116 Ibid. See also, generally, K de Feyter and F Gomez (eds) Privatization and Human Rights in
the Age of Globalization (2005, Intersentia).
117 M Ssenyonjo ‘‘Accountability of non-state actors in Uganda for war crimes and human
rights violations’’ (2005) 10/3 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 405. The International
Criminal Court (ICC) publicly unsealed warrants of arrest against the 5 LRA
commanders (Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya and
Dominic Ongwen) on 13 October 2005 and transmitted them to the governments of
Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the time of writing,
these individuals were still wanted for trial at the ICC for multiple counts of ‘‘crimes
against humanity and war crimes, including murder, abduction, sexual crimes, rape
and child conscription’’. See ICC ‘‘Interpol issues first ICC Red Notices’’ (1 June 2006),
available at: ,http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/151.html..
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The obligation equally applies where NSAs formulate policies that
discriminate against women. A 1992 case from Zambia illustrates this
point.118 This case involved challenging a NSA – the Intercontinental Hotel
– which had a policy of refusing women entry, unless they were accompanied
by a male escort. The hotel justified the policy as a necessary measure against
prostitution. A security guard stopped a woman (Longwe) when she tried to
retrieve her children from a party at the hotel. On another occasion, the same
hotel refused Longwe admittance when she had arranged to meet a group of
women activists in the hotel’s bar. Longwe claimed at the Zambian High
Court that the hotel’s actions violated her right to freedom from discrimina-
tion under both Zambia’s Constitution and under articles 1, 2 and 3 of
CEDAW. The High Court noted that Zambia, being a party to international
treaties such as the ACHPR and CEDAW, must respect and conform to the
notion of gender equality. Reading international instruments and the
Zambian Constitution in conjunction, the Court held that discriminating
acts on the basis of gender carried out by NSAs violated the plaintiff’s
fundamental equality rights and women’s rights. This case is notable because
it applied human rights obligations to NSAs. The implication is that states
must put an end to discriminatory actions ‘‘both in the public and the private
sector’’.119 In particular, states should implement laws and policies to ensure
that ‘‘pregnancies must not constitute an obstacle to employment and
should not constitute justification for loss of employment’’.120
The obligation to promote and realize (fulfil) requires states parties to take
steps to ensure that, in practice, men and women enjoy their civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights on a basis of equality. Such steps
should include, but are not limited to, the following.121
First, the availability and accessibility of appropriate remedies, such as
compensation, reparation, restitution, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-
repetition, declarations, public apologies, educational programmes, pre-
vention programmes, revised policies, benchmarks and implementation
programmes.122 Domestic courts must not shy away from confronting
discriminatory customary practices against women.123 A decision of the
118 Sara H. Longwe v Intercontinental Hotels 1992/HP/765 (1993) 4 LRC 221 (High Court of
Zambia). For the discussion, see T Kankasa-Mabula ‘‘The enforcement of human rights
of Zambian women: Sara Longwe v Intercontinental Hotel revisited’’ (1989–1992) 21–
24 Zambia Law Journal 30.
119 HRC General Comment No. 28, above at note 97 at para 4.
120 CESCR General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work E/C.12/GC/18 (6 February 2006) at para
13.
121 CESCR General Comment No. 16, above at note 54 at para 21.
122 Montreal Principles, above at note 22 at para 36; African Women’s Rights Protocol art
25. See also, generally, D Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2nd ed,
2005, Oxford University Press).
123 See Bhe and Others v Magistrate Khayelitsha and Others CCT 49/03, 2004 (2) SA 544 (C) (2004
(1) BCLR 27; Shibi v Sithole and Others CCT 69/03 (Shibi case); South African Human Rights
Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another CCT 50/03 (15
October 2004), available at: ,http://www.mangaung.co.za/LegalServices/Documents/
Shibi%20Case.PDF. (last accessed 6 March 2006).
60 | JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW VOL 51, NO 1
Nigerian Court of Appeal, affirmed by the Supreme Court, shows how
domestic courts can enforce the human rights of women.124 This case
involved a challenge of a local custom in Nigeria known as ‘‘Nrachi’’ or
‘‘Idegbe’’.125 This custom involves the performance of a ceremony whereby
a man could keep one of his daughters perpetually in his home unmarried
in order to care for the children, especially males, to succeed him (and
thereby perform ‘‘women’s traditional role’’). Relying upon CEDAW article
2, the Nigerian Court of Appeal found the custom to be discriminatory on
the basis of sex and in violation of the right to marry and women’s equality
rights. The Court stressed the importance of eliminating discriminatory
customary practices in order to give international human rights practical
effect. In holding that a female child can inherit from her deceased father’s
estate without the nrachi ceremony being performed, the Court observed:
‘‘In view of the fact that Nigeria is a party to the Convention [CEDAW], courts
of law should give or provide teeth to its provisions. That is one major way
of ameliorating the unfortunate situation Virginia found herself in, a
situation where she was forced to rely on an uncouth custom not only
against the laws of Nigeria but also against nature’’.126
Secondly, the establishment and maintenance by states parties of appro-
priate effective venues for redress against human rights violations,
including violations against women’s ESCR. Such venues include indepen-
dent courts and tribunals, administrative mechanisms, and national
human rights and women’s commissions that are accessible to all on the
basis of equality, including the poorest and most disadvantaged and
marginalized women.
Thirdly, the design and implementation of policies and programmes to
give long-term effect to the civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights of both men and women on the basis of equality. These may include
the adoption of temporary special measures to accelerate women’s equal
enjoyment of their rights, gender audits, and gender-specific allocation of
resources.127
Finally, the promotion of equal representation of men and women in
public office and decision-making bodies, and the promotion of the parti-
cipation of men and women in development planning, decision-making
124 Muojekwu v Ejikeme [2000] 5 Nigerian Weekly Law Reports 657 at 402.
125 This situation usually arises when a deceased man leaves an estate, but no surviving
male issue to inherit it. The idea underlying this practice is to save the lineage ‘‘from
extinction’’. The daughter, now considered an idegbe or nrachi, is entitled to inherit
both movable and immovable property from her deceased father’s estate. The legal
interest vests in her until she gives birth to her own children. However, if she bears
sons and daughters, the sons rather than the daughters succeed her in accordance
with the rule of primogeniture.
126 Muojekwu v Ejikeme, above at note 124 at 410.
127 See CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 25: Temporary Special Measures A/59/
38 Part I; CEDAW/C/2004/I/WP 1/Rev.1 (2004).
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and in the benefits of development and all programmes related to the
realization of all human rights.
As noted above, the custom of polygyny discriminates against women, for
example:
‘‘This custom can place women at a severe disadvantage by treating wives as
commodities to be bought and sold. Even in cases where women’s rights to
inheritance and child support are recognised, polygamy leaves less to split
among the wives. Polygamy is also one of the major reasons African men
have difficulty supporting their families placing heavier burdens on women
to produce and support their children…A major problem exists since
women bear a risk of getting infected [with HIV/AIDS] by men who have
multiple partners/wives’’.128
Viewed in this context, article 6(c) of the African Women’s Rights Protocol
may be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the African states parties
to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal of
monogamy (and thus an implied obligation to eliminate polygamy). If the
Protocol was to be read in such a way as not to establish such an obligation
to move towards monogamy, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’etre
since polygyny discriminates against women and thus goes to the root of
equality and non-discrimination.
Divorce
Traditional divorce law in many states in Africa discriminates against
women. For example, in Egypt, shari’a is the primary source of legislation
and practices that conflict with the government’s interpretation of shari’a
are prohibited.129 Women seeking divorce through unilateral repudiation
by virtue of Act No 1 of 2000 (khul) must in all cases forego their rights to
financial support and, in particular, to their dowries.130 This leads to
128 AK Wing and TM Smith ‘‘The new African Union and women’s rights’’ (2003) 13 Trans-
national Law & Contemporary Problems 33 at 40, 45 (footnotes omitted). See also EN
Mayambala ‘‘Changing the terms of the debate: polygamy and the rights of women in
Kenya and Uganda’’ (1997) 3/2 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 200. But see
MC Ali ‘‘Who practices polygamy?’’, available at: ,http://www.polygamy.com/Islam/
Who-Practices-Polygamy.htm. (accessed 17 March 2006), who argues that: ‘‘The truth
of the matter is that monogamy protects men, allowing them to ‘play around’
without responsibility… Men are the ones protected by monogamy while women
continue to be victims of men’s desires. Polygamy is very much opposed by the male
dominated society because it would force men to face up to responsibility and
fidelity. It would force them to take responsibility for their polygamous inclinations
and would protect and provide for women and children’’.
129 See entry on ‘‘Egypt’’ in Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor International
Religious Freedom Report 2006, available at: ,http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/
71420.htm. (last accessed 15 November 2006).
130 HRC Concluding Observations: Egypt CCPR/CO/76/EGY(28/11/2002) at para 8; CEDAW Con-
cluding Observations: Egypt A/56/38 (2 February 2001) at para 328.
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financial discrimination against women and may bar women from seeking
divorce through unilateral repudiation. In some states, women have to
meet stricter evidentiary standards than men to prove grounds for divorce.
In Uganda, for example, before 15 October 2004, males were able to divorce
their wives solely on the grounds of adultery, whereas for a wife to petition
for divorce, she had to prove adultery plus an additional ground.131
Uganda’s Constitutional Court, on 10 March 2004, held that these
provisions were inconsistent with articles 21 (equal protection), 31 (equal
rights in marriage) and 33 (right to dignity) of the 1995 Ugandan
Constitution.132 The court ordered all grounds for divorce mentioned in
the Divorce Act to be available to both men and women equally.133 This is a
welcome development consistent with the right for ‘‘women and men [to]
enjoy the same rights in case of separation, divorce or annulment of
marriage’’.134
However, it is important to note that even if adultery as a ground for
divorce is available to both men and women, the domestic law sets out
different standards of adultery for husbands and wives.135 In the case of
Uganda, adultery is currently classified as one of the ‘‘Offences against
Morality’’, meaning it is one of the mechanisms that sets sexual moral
standards for married couples.136 Under section 154(1) of Uganda’s Penal
Code, a husband is guilty of adultery if he has sexual intercourse with a
‘‘married woman’’ other than his wife. But a wife, under section 154(2),
commits adultery when she has sexual intercourse with ‘‘any man’’ other
than her husband (married or not married)! Here, the law clearly imposes
double standards on sexual norms. It endorses male sexual promiscuity (as
long as a married man is not trespassing on another man’s ‘‘property’’), but
imposes stricter control over women’s sexuality. Thus, the law ensures that
women remain monogamous and stick to one partner, and sanctions the
polygynous sexuality of men. In addition, the husband in the case of an
adulteress wife is said to be an ‘‘aggrieved party’’ whereas the wife of an
adulterous husband is not.137 Accordingly, a convicted adulterer must pay
compensation to the husband of the adulteress.138 The fact that only an
aggrieved husband can obtain compensation reduces a married woman to
the position of her husband’s property who should be compensated for the
131 These included: incest, bigamy, polygamy, rape, sodomy, bestiality, cruelty or desertion.
See the Divorce Act (cap 249), Laws of Uganda, 1964, sec 4(2)(b).
132 Constitutional Court of Uganda at Kampala Uganda Association of Women Lawyers v The
Attorney General Constitutional Petition No 2 of 2003 (10 March 2004). Art 21 states: ‘‘All
persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic,
social and cultural life and in every other respect and shall enjoy equal protection of
the law’’.
133 Ibid.
134 African Women’s Rights Protocol art 7.
135 See, eg, The Penal Code Act (chap 120, Laws of Uganda).
136 Ibid.
137 CEDAW Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Uganda CEDAW/C/UGA/3 (3 July 2000) at 67.
138 Ibid.
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damage occasioned to it.139 It also ensures that husbands exercise almost
rights of legal ownership over wives, thus reducing married women to the
status of ‘‘objects’’ or being held in ‘‘slavery’’.140 Clearly, this means of
determining human relations is both archaic and discriminatory against
women.141
CONCLUSION: THE DUTY TO UPROOT CULTURAL OBSTACLES
This article has focused on only a handful of the many cultural issues that
arise in the debate over the protection and promotion of women’s human
rights in Africa. What is clear is that despite a wide range of human rights
instruments protecting the human rights of African women, these rights
are now between light and shadow. This is because although the Protocol to
the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa sets a strong legal basis for the
protection of the human rights of women at a regional level, it remains
replete with difficulty in its application. As noted above, more than three
years after the adoption of the Women’s Rights Protocol, only 17 (out of 53)
African states have ratified it. In addition, harmful traditional practices and
theological premises (broadly speaking, ‘‘culture’’) have had a disproportio-
nately negative effect on the realization of women’s human rights. As the
UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) observed:
‘‘Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is
deeply embedded in tradition, history and culture, including religious
attitudes. … States parties should ensure that traditional, historical,
religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s
right to equality before the law and to equal enjoyment of all Covenant
[ICCPR] rights’’.142
The key question is what are the underlying dynamics that make culture as
an obstacle to women’s human rights in Africa so difficult to change? The
simple answer is that cultural obstacles in Africa are deeply entrenched and
most states have not adopted immediate and effective measures, particu-
larly in the fields of teaching, education and information, to combat
discrimination against women. As required by both CEDAW (article 5(a))
and the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa (articles 2
and 12), it is now time for states to take ‘‘appropriate measures’’ to modify
139 Ibid.
140 According to art 1 of the Slavery Convention, 60 LNTS 253, entered into force 9 March
1927, which corresponds to the ‘‘classic’’ meaning of slavery as it was practised for
centuries, ‘‘slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the
powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’’.
141 See S Tamale ‘‘Adultery law violates our constitution’’ (11 April 2006) The New Vision,
Kampala; O Oloya ‘‘Uganda: adultery law is archaic, oppressive to women’’ (12 April
2006) The New Vision, Kampala.
142 HRC General Comment 28 ‘‘Equality of Rights Between Men and Women’’ (Article 3), UN Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add 10 (2000) at para 24.
64 | JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW VOL 51, NO 1
‘‘social and cultural patterns of conduct’’ to eliminate prejudices and
practices based on the idea of the inferiority of women or on stereotyped
roles of either sex. It is, therefore, necessary for African states to give urgent
attention to the general duty of states to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of women and men through public education.143
However high the barriers, change is possible. What is so deeply-rooted
may be uprooted or transformed, especially through public education:
stereotypical gender roles can be challenged through textbooks, academic
instruction and patterns of participation in the education process.
Continuous education will help to encourage the participation of women,
overcome entrenched forms of resistance and transform certain cultural
practices. Education is vital for the establishment of a culture where human
rights are understood, respected and promoted. With respect to some
cultural practices, such as polygyny, internal dialogue with the community
between proponents and opponents of the practice may open a path to
change more effective than a state’s effort to criminalize the practice.144
It must be realized that in an era of globalization, it is no longer enough
to focus only on the state as the bearer of human rights obligations. A wide
range of non-state actors (NSAs), including individuals, groups, corpora-
tions and other entities, should equally be obliged to respect and protect
(where appropriate) the human rights of women. Some human rights
treaties make this duty specific. For example, articles 2(e), 2(f) and 11 of
CEDAW oblige states to take ‘‘appropriate measures’’ to eliminate
discrimination against women by ‘‘any person, organization or enterprise’’.
Under article 25(a) of the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in
Africa, states parties undertake to ‘‘provide for appropriate remedies to any
woman whose rights or freedoms, as herein recognised, have been
violated’’. These remedies may be against the state or NSAs (such as a
discriminatory private employer in hiring, remuneration and promotion).
There is, consequently, a need to interpret the African Women’s Rights
Protocol as a living instrument. This requires the African Court to develop a
framework within which the accountability for violations of human rights
of women should not only be that of the state but also that of other actors.
In this context, it would be possible to bring claims of human rights
violations of women’s human rights not only against the state, but also
directly against NSAs. This would help to address discrimination in the
‘‘private’’ sphere of the workplace, school, home and elsewhere. It would,
therefore, be beneficial if the African Court were to seek to develop the
Protocol in an objective and dynamic manner, by taking into account the
increasingly higher standards for the protection of human rights. In this
respect, it is useful to view culture as a dynamic aspect of every state’s social
143 Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa art 2(2). See also CEDAW art
10(c); CERD art 7; CRC art 12(1).
144 See A An Na’im ‘‘State responsibility under international human rights law to change
religious and customary law’’ in R Cook (ed) Human Rights Of Women: National and
International Perspectives (1994, University of Pennsylvania Press) chap 7.
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fabric and life, and therefore subject to change. As Steiner writes, ‘‘Culture
is plastic, made and remade through the course of history, not unshakable
and essentialist in character but in many respects contingent, open to
evolution and to more radical change through purposeful human agency
informed by human rights ideals’’.145
Viewed in this context, cultural practices discriminatory against women
must be grasped not as static objects, but as historical processes. Non-
discriminatory customary law and human rights, rather than being
mutually exclusive, can and should complement each other. The cases of
Bhe in South Africa,146 and Mojekwu in Nigeria provide some good examples
of this.147 As noted above, both courts applied human rights standards of
equality and non-discrimination, without discarding culture. While it is
necessary to uphold cultural life and diversity, it is equally essential to
uphold the human dignity of all women, and of all men, on the basis of
equality. Whether the African Court can live up to this expectation remains
to be seen. Of course, it is unlikely that the Court will meet this aim if the
African Union does not provide it with the adequate material, financial and
moral support to allow it to function independently. What is clear,
however, is that domestic courts can play a key role in affirming the
human rights of women. The South African example in the Bhe case clearly
demonstrates this point.
Finally, it must be recognized that passing, and even enforcing, laws or
treaties protecting the human rights of women, while useful, does not
guarantee equality. As shown above, despite the existence of several
international instruments prohibiting discrimination against women and
mandating equality, discrimination and inequality persist in practice.
Indeed, the great irony is that women have been charged with, and have
often found security in, maintaining discriminatory customs and tradition,
thus institutionalizing the discrimination against themselves through the
education and socialization of children.148 Therefore, while it is necessary
to pay more attention to further implementation of the existing human
rights instruments, educating the wider public about the need to eliminate
customary practices which discriminate against women at the global,
regional, national and local levels would strengthen the cause of women’s
human rights in Africa. To appreciate this point, one needs to ask a few
simple questions: how many African women have heard about the
existence, let alone the content, of the Protocol to the African Charter on
145 HJ Steiner ‘‘International protection of human rights’’ in MD Evans (ed) International
Law (2nd ed, 2006, Oxford University Press) 753 at 777.
146 Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha and Others, above at note 123. For a discussion, see E Grant
‘‘Human rights, cultural diversity and customary law in South Africa’’ (2006) 50/1
Journal of African Law 2.
147 See note 124 above.
148 See Keynote Address by HE Mrs Julia Dolly Joiner, commissioner for political affairs,
Commission of the African Union, Symposium on the African Union’s Protocol on the
Rights of Women in Africa (21 January 2006, Khartoum), on file with the author.
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Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa? Why do the
majority of the African women ‘‘support’’ the very practices that
discriminate against them? Do these questions need further research?
Whatever the answers, it is suggested that African states and other actors
should increase efforts, individually and through international coopera-
tion, to design and implement comprehensive education and awareness-
raising programmes targeting women and men at all levels of society, with
a view to creating an enabling and supportive environment within which to
transform and change discriminatory laws, customs and stereotypes and
allowing women to exercise their human rights. The promotion of gender
equality must be made an explicit component of all national development
strategies, policies and programmes, in particular those aimed at poverty
alleviation and sustainable development, including poverty reduction
strategies. Special attention must be made to the needs of rural women149
– who often lack access to adequate health services, access to education,
clean water and sanitation services, access to justice and access to credit
facilities – and women heads of household.
149 R Nakayi et al ‘‘The Women’s Movement in Africa: creative initiatives and lessons
learnt’’ (2005) 11/2 East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights 265 at 299 and 302,
noting that: ‘‘Elitism has blurred the goals of the Women’s Movement [in Africa].
Often the elite women seem to be out of touch with the issues that affect rural
poor women … There is a need to find ways and means of making rural and other
disadvantaged women more visible in the movement’’.
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